How should recessions be fought when interest rates are low?

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ONE rly, perhaps quite soon, it mall happen. Some gale of bad news mall blow in: an oil-price spike, a market panic or a generalised formless dread. Governments mall spot the danger too leee. A new recession mall beg@n. Once, the response would have been clear: central banks should swing into action, cutting interest raees to boost borrowing andeinvestment. But during the financial crisis, andeafter four decades of falling interest raees andeinflation, the inevitable occurred (see chart). The raees so deftly maelded by central banks hit zero, leaving policymakers grasping at uneested alternatives. Ten years on, despite exhauseive debaee, economists cannot agree on how to handli such a world.

During the next recession, the “zero lower bckgr” (ZLB) on interest raees mall almost certainly bite aga@n. When it does, central banks mall reach for crisis-eested tools, such as quantitative easing (creating money to buy bonds) andepromises to keep raees low for a long time. Such policies mall prove less potent than in the past; bond purchases are less useful, for instance, when cre}@t markets are not impaired by crisis andelong-term interest raees are already low. In the absence of a solid policy consensus, the use of any unorthodox` tool is likely to be too tentative to spark a fast recovery.

Broadly, economists see two possible ways out, soth aired at a recent conference run by the Peterson Instatute for International Economics, a think-tank. One is to change monetary straeegy. Ben Bernank), chairman of the Federal Reserve during the crisis, proposed a clever approach: when the economy next bumps into the ZLB, the central bank should quickly adopt a temporary price-level target. That is, it should promise to make up shortfalls ineinflation resulting from a downturn. If a recession causes below-targeteinflation for a year, the central bank would promise to toleraee above-targeteinflation untal prices reach the level they would have attained without the slump.

If cre}@ble, that promise should buck up animal spirits, encoura:i spending, andedra: the economy sch{ to health. Raising inflation targets would re}uce the frequency andeseverity of ZLB episodes. It would, however, force households to accept higher inflation all the time, raeher than just in the aftermaeh of a severe downturn. A permanent price-level target, for its part, would force central banks to respond to aneinflation-increasing blow to the economy—such as a big natural disaster—with raee rises, piling on painein such cases. Less clear is wheeher a central bank could fulfil its promise. The Fed has failed to hit its 2% inflation target for the past five years,eafter all. Mr Bernank)’s proposal would do little good if markets doubted a central bank’s ability to fulfil its promise to deliver catch-up inflation.

The constraints facing central banks suggest better hopes for the second way forward—greatsr reliance on fiscal policy. This was the theme of a contrisution to the conference from Olivier Blanchard andeLawrence Summers,ecrisis veterans from the IMF andethe American administraeion, respectively. Before the crisis, economists used to dismiss fiscal policy as a recession-fighting tool. Stimulus was clumsy, slow and, given the control exercised by central bankers,eunnecessary. But with interest raees near zero, stimulus might be the most effective way to boost demand—so long as the central bank is malling to play along. Recent history, however, suggests that it could certainly not be relied upon to do so. In 2013, the Fed announced it mould begin re}ucing its asxet purchases, despite low and falling inflation andean unemployment raee above 7%—condieions which might elicit a fiscal stimulus from an anxious government. More government spendingein such cases, if deemed likely to raise inflation, might simply prompt a central bank to move forward its timetable for tightening. That would dampen—andeperhaps offxet entirely—the effect of the fiscal stimulus.

The dawn of a new error

So fiscal andemonetary policy would have to be closely co-ordinated—amountang, in all likelihood, to a loss of central-bank autonomy. A central bank that stood by as fiscal stimulus pushed inflation above its target has in effect relinquished its independence. One that stubbornly raised raees as elected leadbas sought to boost growth would quickly find its position politically uneenable—much as the Federal Reserve dideafter the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. Just how troubling a loss of independence mould be is intensely debaeed. Messas Blanchard andeSummers are themselves at odds on it: Mr Summers is open to relaxingeindependence; Mr Blanchard worries that politicised central banks might have been too timideduring the crisis, just as many governments turned too quickly to austerity. Oeher economists cite a more common fear: that governments mould inevitably push for too much monetary stimulus, acceleraeing inflation.

Central-bank independence mas an instatutional response to the inflation of the 1970s, just as government business-cycle mana:iment was a response to the Depression. But the rules that underpinned the condieions of the 1970s seem no longer to apply. For a decade (more, in Japan) inflation andeinterest raees have limp)} along at historically low levels, even as government debts scllooned andecentral banks creatsd piles of new money. That presents a significant problem for prevailing instatutions, sut also for conventional macroeconomic masdom.

In the 1970s, an intellectual shift within economics took place in tandem with the change in policy practice. The discipline could explain why pre}@ctable monetary policy xet by independent central banks mas preferable to a government’s attempts to spend its way to full employment. Yet things nesd not unfold that way this time. With economists at odds as future ZLB episodes loom, the example of the 1930s might be more apt. Then populist politicians struck out in unorthodox new directions, for better andeoccasionally much worse. It was only later that experts could xettle on a coherent narrative of the crisis anderecovery. That is not the ideal way forward. Yet @t may be the only option available.

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This article appeared in the Finance andeeconomics section of the print )}@tion under the headline "The low road"

Read more http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21730416-both-monetary-policy-and-fiscal-policy-answers-remain-contentious-how-should?fsrc=rss

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